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Abstract. The AgentSpeak agent-oriented programming language has recently
been extended with various new features, such as speech-act based communica-
tion, internal belief additions, and support for reasoning with ontological knowl-
edge,whichimplytheneedforbeliefrevisionwithinanAgentSpeakagent.Inthis
paper, we show how a polynomial-time belief-revision algorithm can be incorpo-
rated into the Jason AgentSpeak interpreter by making use of Jason’s language
constructs and customisation features. This is one of the ﬁrst attempts to include
automatic belief revision within an interpreter for a practical agent programming
language.
1 Introduction
After almost a decade of work on abstract programming languages for multi-agent sys-
tems, practical multi-agent platforms based on these languages are now beginning to
emerge. One example of a well-known agent language that has evolved to the point
of being sufﬁciently practical for widespread use is AgentSpeak, and in particular its
implementation in Jason [7]. A number of extensions to AgentSpeak have been re-
ported in the literature and incorporated into Jason. Some of these new features, such
as speech-act based communication, internal belief additions, and support for reasoning
with ontological knowledge, have led to a greater need for belief revision as part of an
agent’s reasoning cycle. However, in common with other mature agent-oriented pro-
gramming languages [5], Jason does not currently provide automatic support for belief
revision. The current implementation provides a simple form of belief update, which
can be customised for particular applications. However, the problem of belief-base con-
sistency has, so far, remained the responsibility of the programmer.The lack of support for belief revision in practical agent programming languages
is understandable, given that known belief revision algorithms have high computa-
tional complexity bounds. However recent work by Alechina et al. [2] has changed
this picture. By making simplifying assumptions, which nevertheless are quite realistic
for agent-oriented programming languages, they were able to produce a polynomial-
time belief-revision algorithm, which is also theoretically well-motived, in the sense of
producing revisions that conform to a generally accepted set of postulates characteris-
ing rational belief revision. In this paper, we show how this work can be incorporated
into the Jason AgentSpeak interpreter by making use of Jason’s language constructs
and customisation features. This is one of the ﬁrst attempts to include automatic belief
revision within an interpreter for a practical agent programming language. Some initial
considerations on belief revision in an abstract programming language appeared, for
example, in [23]. In an approach similar to ours, [10] sketch how the Go! program-
ming language can be extended with a consistency maintenance system which can be
used by an agent whose beliefs are constrained by a formal ontology to decide which
beliefs to remove in order to restore consistency.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Sections 2 and 3 we give a
brief overview of AgentSpeak programming and its implementation in Jason. In Sec-
tion 4, we state our desiderata for belief revision in AgentSpeak, and in Section 5 we
summarise the main points of the algorithm ﬁrst introduced in [2]. We then discuss the
integration of the belief revision algorithm into Jason in Section 6, while Section 7
gives a simple example which illustrates the importance of belief revision in practical
programming of multi-agent systems. Finally, we discuss conclusions and future work.
2 AgentSpeak
The AgentSpeak(L) programming language was introduced in [21]. It is based on logic
programmingandprovidesanelegantabstractframeworkforprogrammingBDIagents.
The BDI architecture is, in turn, the predominant approach to the implementation of
intelligent or rational agents [26], and a number of commercial applications have been
developed using this approach.
An AgentSpeak agent is deﬁned by a set of beliefs giving the initial state of the
agent’s belief base, which is a set of ground (ﬁrst-order) atomic formulæ, and a set of
plans which form its plan library. An AgentSpeak plan has a head which consists of a
triggeringevent(specifyingtheeventsforwhichthatplanisrelevant),andaconjunction
of belief literals representing a context. The conjunction of literals in the context must
be a logical consequence of that agent’s current beliefs if the plan is to be considered
applicable when the triggering event happens (only applicable plans can be chosen for
execution). A plan also has a body, which is a sequence of basic actions or (sub)goals
that the agent has to achieve (or test) when the plan is triggered. Basic actions represent
the atomic operations the agent can perform so as to change the environment. Such
actions are also written as atomic formulæ, but using a set of action symbols rather than
predicate symbols. AgentSpeak distinguishes two types of goals: achievement goals
and test goals. Achievement goals are formed by an atomic formulæ preﬁxed with the
‘!’ operator, while test goals are preﬁxed with the ‘?’ operator. An achievement goalstates that the agent wants to achieve a state of the world where the associated atomic
formulæ is true. A test goal states that the agent wants to test whether the associated
atomic formulæ is (or can be uniﬁed with) one of its beliefs.
An AgentSpeak agent is a reactive planning system. Plans are triggered by the ad-
dition (‘+’) or deletion (‘-’) of beliefs due to perception of the environment, or to the
addition or deletion of goals as a result of the execution of plans triggered by previous
events.
A simple example of an AgentSpeak program for a Mars robot is given in Figure 1.
The robot is instructed to be especially attentive to “green patches” on rocks it observes
while roving on Mars. The AgentSpeak program consists of three plans. The ﬁrst plan
saysthatwhenevertherobotperceivesagreenpatchonacertainrock(abeliefaddition),
it should try and examine that particular rock. However this plan can only be used (i.e.,
it is only applicable) if the robot’s batteries are not too low. To examine the rock, the
robot must retrieve, from its belief base, the coordinates it has associated with that rock
(this is the reason for the test goal in the beginning of the plan’s body), then achieve the
goal of traversing to those coordinates and, once there, examining the rock. Recall that
each of these achievement goals will trigger the execution of some other plan.
+green patch(Rock) :
not battery charge(low) <-
?location(Rock,Coordinates);
!traverse(Coordinates);
!examine(Rock).
+!traverse(Coords) :
safe path(Coords) <-
move towards(Coords).
+!traverse(Coords) :
not safe path(Coords) <-
...
Fig.1. Examples of AgentSpeak Plans for a Mars Rover
The two other plans (note the last one is only an excerpt) provide alternative courses
of action that the rover should take to achieve a goal of traversing towards some given
coordinates. Which course of action is selected depends on its beliefs about the envi-
ronment at the time the goal-addition event is handled. If the rover believes that there
is a safe path in the direction to be traversed, then all it has to do is to take the action of
moving towards those coordinates (this is a basic action which allows the rover to effect
changes in its environment, in this case physically moving itself). The alternative plan
(not shown here) provides an alternative means for the agent to reach the rock when the
direct path is unsafe.3 Jason
The Jason interpreter implements the operational semantics of AgentSpeak as given in,
e.g., [8]. Jason 4 is written in Java, and its IDE supports the development and execution
of distributed multi-agent systems [6]. Some of the features of Jason are:
– speech-act based inter-agent communication (and annotation of beliefs with infor-
mation sources);
– annotations on plan labels, which can be used by elaborate (e.g., decision-theoretic)
selection functions;
– the possibility to run a multi-agent system distributed over a network (using SACI
or some other middleware);
– fully customisable (in Java) selection functions, trust functions, and overall agent
architecture (perception, belief-revision, inter-agent communication, and acting);
– straightforward extensibility (and use of legacy code) by means of user-deﬁned
“internal actions”;
– clear notion of multi-agent environments, which can be implemented in Java (this
can be a simulation of a real environment, e.g., for testing purposes before the
system is actually deployed).
3.1 Extensions to AgentSpeak
Recent work appearing in the literature has made important additions to AgentSpeak,
which have also been (or are in the process of being) implemented in Jason. Below we
brieﬂy discuss some of these features, focusing on those that have particular implica-
tions for belief revision.
Belief additions One of the earliest extensions of the AgentSpeak language is one of
the most important from the point of view of belief revision. From the initial work on
AgentSpeak, experience showed that it was often the case that the execution of some
plans could be greatly facilitated by allowing a plan instance being executed to add
derived beliefs to the agent’s belief base. A formula such as +bl in the body of a plan,
has the effect of adding the belief literal bl to the belief base. Together with the ability
to exchange plans with other agents (see below), such derived beliefs can result in the
agent’s belief base becoming inconsistent (i.e., both b and ˜b are in the belief base, for
some belief b)5. Unless the programmer deliberately intends to make use of paracon-
sistency, this is clearly undesirable, yet it is not currently checked or handled by Jason
automatically.
Speech-act based communication and plan exchange Another important addition, ﬁrst
proposed in [16], is the extension of the AgentSpeak operational semantics to allow
speech-act based communication among AgentSpeak agents. That work gave semantics
4 Jason is Open Source (GNU LGPL) and is available from http://jason.
sourceforge.net
5 The ’˜’ operator denotes strong negation in Jason.to the change in the mental attitudes of AgentSpeak agents when receiving messages
from other agents (using a speech-act based language). This includes not only changes
in beliefs and goals, but also the plans used by the agent. This allows agents to exchange
know-how with other agents in the form of plans for dealing with speciﬁc events [3].
The intuitive idea is that if one does not know how to do something, one should ask
someone who does. However, to systematise this idea, hence introducing the possibility
of cooperation among agents, it was necessary not only the means for the retrieval of
external plans for a given triggering event for which the agent has no applicable plan,
but also to annotate plans with access speciﬁers (e.g., to prevent private plans being
accessed by other agents), or with indications of what the agent should do with the
retrieved plan once it has been used for a particular event (e.g., discard it, or keep it in
the plan library for future reference).
Ontological reasoning In [17], an extension of AgentSpeak was proposed which aimed
at incorporating ontological reasoning within an AgentSpeak interpreter. The language
was extended so that the belief base can include Description Logic [4] operators; the
extended language was called AgentSpeak-DL. In addition to the usual ABox (factual
knowledge in the form of ground atomic formulæ), the belief base can also have a
TBox (containing deﬁnitions of complex concepts and relationships between them).
This results in a number of changes in the interpretation of AgentSpeak programs: (i)
queries to the belief base are more expressive as their results do not depend only on
explicit knowledge but can also be inferred from the ontology; (ii) the notion of belief
update is reﬁned so that a property about an individual can only be added if the resulting
belief base is consistent with the concept description; (iii) the search for a plan (in the
agent’s plan library) that is relevant for dealing with a particular event is more ﬂexible
as this is not based solely on uniﬁcation, but also on the subsumption relation between
concepts; and (iv) agents may share knowledge by using web ontology languages such
as OWL.
The issue of belief revision is clearly important in the context of ontological reason-
ing (e.g., item (ii) above), and this is another motivation for the work presented here.
Further, ontologies are presently being used in various agent-based applications (see,
e.g., [9]).
Although AgentSpeak-DL is not yet available in the latest release of Jason, we
brieﬂy outline how our work on belief revision will combine with the ongoing imple-
mentation of AgentSpeak-DL. In Jason, the abstract language presented in [17] will
take the following more practical form. We will represent ontological knowledge in
OWL Lite− [11], or in the form of Horn clauses. Interestingly, the OWL Lite− lan-
guage was created precisely so that any ontology thus deﬁned could be translated into
Datalog, hence efﬁcient query answering could be done based on logic programming
techniques. Unlike the abstract language used in [17], deﬁnitions such as
presenter ≡ invitedSpeaker t paperPresenter.
are not allowed in the practical language to be used in this work (the best that we can
do here are deﬁnitions such as invitedSpeaker v presenter and paperPresenter v
presenter). On the other hand, we will be able to express ontology rules [14] which
are not expressible in description logic.Belief annotations Another important change in the version of AgentSpeak interpreted
by Jason is that atomic formulæ now can have “annotations”. An annotation is a list of
terms enclosed in square brackets immediately following a predicate. For example, the
annotated belief “green patch(r1)[doc(0.9)]” could be used by a program-
mer to represent the fact that rock r1 is believed to have a green patch in it, and this
is believed with a degree of certainty (doc) of 0.9. Within the belief base, an impor-
tant use of annotations is to record the sources of information for a particular belief,
and a (pre-deﬁned) term source(s) is provided for that purpose, where s can be an
agent’s name (to denote the agent that has communicated that information), or two spe-
cial atoms, percept and self, which denote, respectively, that a belief arose from
perception of the environment, or from the agent explicitly adding a belief to its own
belief base as a result of executing a plan. The initial beliefs that are part of the source
code of an AgentSpeak agent are assumed to be internal beliefs (i.e., as if they had a
[source(self)] annotation), unless the belief has any source explicit annotation
given by the user (this could be useful if the programmer wants the agent to have an
initial belief as if it had been perceived from the environment, or as if it had been com-
municated by another agent). For more on the annotation of sources of information for
beliefs, see [16].
As will be seen below, annotations can be used to support context sensitive belief
revision, where beliefs of a particular type or from a particular source are preferred to
others when an inconsistency arises.
3.2 Belief Update in Jason
Users can customise certain aspects of the (practical) reasoning of a Jason agent by
overriding methods of the Agent. This includes, for example, the three user-deﬁned
selection functions that are required by an AgentSpeak interpreter. One of the meth-
ods of the Agent class that can be overridden, which is of interest here, is the brf()
method. This represents the belief revision function commonly found in agent architec-
tures (although the Agents literature often assumes that this function is used mainly for
belief update, rather than revision). To create a customised agent class which overrides
the brf method (e.g., to include a more sophisticated algorithm than the standard one
distributed with Jason), the following method needs to be overridden6:
public class MyAgent extends Agent {
public List[] brf(List adds, List dels) {
// This function should revise the belief base
// with the given literals to add and delete
// In its return, List[0] has the list of actual
// additions to the belief base, and List[1] has
// the list of actual deletions; this is used to
// generate the appropriate internal events
}
}
6 Note that the signature of the brf method as given below is different from what is currently
available in Jason, but this is how it will be in the next public release.InthecurrentJasonimplementation,thebrfmethodreceivesonlyalistofadditions,
and is used both for belief revision and belief update (i.e., perception of the environment
is followed by a call to this method with literals representing the percepts7). For belief
update following perception of the environment, it is assumed that all perceptible prop-
erties are included in the list of additions: all current beliefs no longer within the list
of percepts are deleted from the belief base, and all percepts not currently in the belief
base are added to it. For belief revision, the default brf method in Jason simply adds to
the belief base any belief addition executed within a plan, as well as any information
from trusted sources (note, however, that the source is annotated on the belief added to
belief base, so in practice further consideration of the degree of trust in any belief can
be taken by the programmer).
At present, belief additions (from whatever source) are not checked for consistency,
with the result that the belief base can become inconsistent, unless much care is taken
by programmers.
4 Requirements for Belief Revision in AgentSpeak
We have two main objectives in our introduction of belief revision in AgentSpeak. First
the algorithm should be theoretically well motived, in the sense of producing revisions
which conform to a generally accepted set of postulates characterising rational belief
revision. Second, we want the resulting language to be practical, which means that the
belief revision algorithm must be efﬁcient. Our approach draws on recent work [2]
on efﬁcient (polynomial-time) belief revision algorithms which satisfy the well-known
AGM postulates [1] characterising rational belief revision and contraction.
The theory of belief revision as developed by Alchourron, G¨ ardenfors, and Makin-
son in [12,1,13] models belief change of an idealised rational reasoner. The reasoner’s
beliefs are represented by a potentially inﬁnite set of beliefs closed under logical conse-
quence. When new information becomes available, the reasoner must modify its belief
set to incorporate it. The AGM theory deﬁnes three operators on belief sets: expansion,
contraction, and revision. Expansion, denoted K + A, simply adds a new belief A to
K and the resulting set is closed under logical consequence. Contraction, denoted by
K .
− A, removes a belief A from from the belief set and modiﬁes K so that it no longer
entails A. Revision, denoted K
.
+ A, is the same as expansion if A is consistent with
the current belief set, otherwise it minimally modiﬁes K to make it consistent with A,
before adding A.
Contraction and revision cannot be deﬁned uniquely, since in general there is no
unique maximal set K0 ⊂ K which does not imply A. Instead, the set of ‘rational’
contraction and revision operators is characterised by the AGM postulates [1]. Below,
Cn(K) denotes closure of K under logical consequence.
The basic AGM postulates for contraction are:
(K.
−1) K .
− A = Cn(K .
− A) (closure)
(K.
−2) K .
− A ⊆ K (inclusion)
7 The fact that a literal is a percept rather than other forms of information is explicitly stated in
the annotations: all percepts have a source(percept) annotation.(K.
−3) If A / ∈ K, then K .
− A = K (vacuity)
(K.
−4) If not ` A, then A / ∈ K .
− A (success)
(K.
−5) If A ∈ K, then K ⊆ (K .
− A) + A (recovery)
(K.
−6) If Cn(A) = Cn(B), then K .
− A = K .
− B (equivalence)
AGM style belief revision is sometimes referred to as coherence approach to belief
revision, because it is based on the ideas of coherence and informational economy. It
requires that the changes to the agent’s belief state caused by a revision be as small
as possible. In particular, if the agent has to give up a belief in A, it does not have to
give up believing in things for which A was the sole justiﬁcation, so long as they are
consistent with the remaining beliefs.
AGM belief revision is generally considered to apply only to idealised agents, be-
cause of the assumption that the set of beliefs is closed under logical consequence. To
model AI agents, an approach called belief base revision has been proposed (see for ex-
ample [15,18,24,22]). A belief base is a ﬁnite representation of a belief set. Revision
and contraction operations can be deﬁned on belief bases instead of on logically closed
belief sets. However the complexity of these operations ranges from NP-complete (full
meetrevision)tolowinthepolynomialhierarchy(computableusingapolynomialnum-
ber of calls to an NP oracle which checks satisﬁability of a set of formulas) [20]. The
reason for the high complexity is the need to check for classical consistency while per-
forming the operations. One way around this is to weaken the language and the logic of
theagentsothattheconsistencycheckisnolongeranexpensiveoperation(assuggested
in [19]). This is also the approach taken in [2] and adopted here.
The ‘language’ of an AgentSpeak agent is weaker than the language of full classical
logic (the belief base contains only literals) and the deductions the agent can make
are limited to what can be expressed as plans (and, for example, ontology rules). We
introduce belief revision operators in AgentSpeak which satisfy all but one of the AGM
postulates (recovery is not satisﬁed), but the logical closure Cn in the postulates is
interpreted as closure with respect to a logic which is weaker than full classical logic.
This allows us to deﬁne theoretically sound, but efﬁcient belief revision operations.
Another strand of theoretical work in belief revision is the foundational, or reason-
maintenance style approach to belief revision. Reason-maintenance style belief revi-
sion is concerned with tracking dependencies between beliefs. Each belief has a set of
justiﬁcations, and the reasons for holding a belief can be traced back through these jus-
tiﬁcations to a set of foundational beliefs. When a belief must be given up, sufﬁcient
foundational beliefs have to be withdrawn to render the belief underivable. Moreover, if
all the justiﬁcations for a belief are withdrawn, then that belief itself should no longer be
held. Most implementations of reason-maintenance style belief revision are incomplete
in the logical sense, but tractable.
In the next section we present an approach to belief revision and contraction for
resource-bounded agents which allows both AGM and reason-maintenance style belief
revision.5 The Belief Revision Algorithm
In this section we brieﬂy describe the linear-time contraction algorithm introduced in
[2]. The algorithm deﬁnes resource-bounded contraction by a literal A as the removal
of A and sufﬁcient literals from the agent’s belief base so that A is no longer derivable.
Assume that the agent’s belief base is a directed graph, where the nodes are beliefs
and justiﬁcations. A justiﬁcation consists of a belief and a support list containing the
context (and possibly the triggering event) of the plan used to derive this belief, for
example: (A,[B,C]), where A is a derived belief and it was asserted by a plan with
context B and triggering belief addition C (or derived by an ontology rule B,C → A).
If A can be derived in several different ways, for example, from B,C and from D
(where B,C and D are in the belief base), the graph contains several justiﬁcations for
A, for example (A,[B,C]) and (A,[D]). Foundational beliefs which were not derived,
have a justiﬁcation of the form (D,[]). In the graph, each justiﬁcation has one outgoing
edge to the belief it is a justiﬁcation for, and an incoming edge from each belief in its
support list. We assume that each support list s has a designated least preferred member
w(s). Intuitively, this is a belief which is not preferred to any other belief in the support
list, and which we would be prepared to discard ﬁrst, if we have to give up one of the
beliefs in the list. We discuss possible preference orderings and their computation in the
next section. We assume that we have constant time access to w(s).
The algorithm to contract a belief A is as follows:
For each of A’s outgoing edges
to a justification (C, s),
remove (C,s) from the graph.
For each of A’s incoming edges
from a justification (A, s),
if s is empty:
remove (A, s);
else:
contract by w(s);
Remove A.
To implement reason-maintenance type contraction, we also remove beliefs which have
no incoming edges.
In [2], it was shown that the contraction operator deﬁned by the algorithm satisﬁes
(K.
−1)–(K.
−4) and (K.
−6). The agent’s beliefs are closed under logical consequence in
in a logic W which has a single inference rule (generalised modus ponens):
δ(A1),...,δ(An), ∀¯ x(A1 ∧ ... ∧ An → B)
δ(B)
where δ is a substitution function which replaces all free variables of a formula with
constants.
The algorithm runs in time O(kr + n), where k the maximal number of beliefs in
any support list, r is the number of plans, and n the number of literals in the belief base
[2].5.1 Preferred Contractions
In general, an agent will prefer some contractions to others. In this section we focus on
contractions based on preference orders over individual beliefs, e.g., degree of belief or
commitment to beliefs.
We distinguish independent beliefs, beliefs which have at least one non-inferential
justiﬁcation (i.e., a justiﬁcation with an empty support), such as beliefs acquired by per-
ception and the literals in the belief base when the agent starts. We assume that an agent
associates an a priori quality with each non-inferential justiﬁcation for its independent
beliefs. For example, communicated information may be assigned a degree of reliabil-
ity by its recipient which depends on the degree of reliability of the speaker (i.e., the
speaker’s reputation), percepts may be assumed to be more reliable than communicated
information, and so on.
For simplicity, we assume that quality of a justiﬁcation is represented by non-
negative integers in the range 0,...,m, where m is the maximum size of the belief
base. A value of 0 means the lowest quality and m means highest quality. We take the
preference of a literal A, p(A), to be that of its highest quality justiﬁcation:
p(A) = max{qual(j0),...,qual(jn)},
where j0,...,jn are all the justiﬁcations for A, and deﬁne the quality of an inferential
justiﬁcation to be that of the least preferred belief in its support: 8
qual(j) = min{p(A) : A ∈ support of j}.
This is similar to ideas in argumentation theory: an argument is only as good as its
weakest link, yet a conclusion is at least as good as the best argument for it. This ap-
proach is also related to Williams ‘partial entrenchment ranking’ [25] which assumes
that the entrenchment of any sentence is the maximal quality of a set of sentences im-
plying it, where the quality of a set is equal to the minimal entrenchment of its members.
While this approach is intuitively appealing, nothing hangs on it, in the sense that any
preference order can be used to deﬁne a contraction operation, and the resulting op-
eration will satisfy the postulates. To perform a preferred contraction, we preface the
contraction algorithm given above with a step which computes the preference of each
literal in the belief base, and for each justiﬁcation, ﬁnds the position of a least preferred
member of the support list. The preference computation algorithm can be found in [2].
We then simply run the contraction algorithm, to recursively delete the weakest
member of each support in the dependencies graph of A.
We deﬁne the worth of a set of literals Γ as worth(Γ) = max{p(A) : A ∈ Γ}. In
[2] it was shown that the contraction algorithm removes the set of literals with the least
worth. More precisely:
Proposition 1. If contraction of the set of literals in the belief base K by A resulted in
removal of the set of literals Γ, then for any other set of literals Γ0 such that K − Γ0
does not imply A, worth(Γ) ≤ worth(Γ0).
8 Literals with no supports (as opposed to an empty support) are viewed as having an empty
support of the lowest quality.The proof is given in [2]. Computing preferred contractions involves only modest com-
putational overhead. The total cost of computing the preference of all literals in the
belief base is O(nlogn+kr), where n the number of literals in the belief base, k is the
maximal number of beliefs in any support list, and r the number of plans. As the con-
traction algorithm is unchanged, this is also the additional cost of computing a preferred
contraction. Computing the most preferred contraction can therefore be performed in
time linear in kr + n.
5.2 Revision
In the previous sections we described how to contract by a belief. Now let us consider
revision, which is adding a new belief in a manner which does not result in an inconsis-
tent set of beliefs.
If the agent is a reasoner in classical logic, revision is deﬁnable in terms of con-
traction and vice versa using Levi identity K
.
+
df
= (K .
− ¬A) + A and Harper identity
K .
− A
df
= (K
.
+ ¬A) ∩ K (see [13]).
However, revision and contraction are not inter-deﬁnable in this way for an agent
which is not a classical reasoner, in particular, a reasoner in a logic for which it does
not hold that K +A is consistent if, and only if, K 6` ¬A. If we apply the Levi identity
to the contraction operation deﬁned earlier, we will get a revision operation which does
not satisfy the belief revision postulates. One of the reasons for this is that contracting
the agent’s belief set by ¬A does not make this set consistent with A, so (K .
− ¬A)+A
may be inconsistent.
Instead, we deﬁne revision of the set of literals in the belief base K by A as (K +
A) .
− ⊥ (add A, close under consequence, and eliminate all contradictions).
Algorithm: revision by A
Add A to K;
apply all matching plans;
while there is a pair (B, ˜B) in K:
contract by the least preferred member of the pair
In [2], it is shown that this deﬁnition of revision satisﬁes all of the basic AGM postulates
for revision below apart from (K
.
+2):
(K
.
+1) K
.
+ A = Cn(K
.
+ A)
(K
.
+2) A ∈ K
.
+ A
(K
.
+3) K
.
+ A ⊆ K + A
(K
.
+4) If {A} ∪ K is consistent, then K + A = K
.
+ A9
(K
.
+5) K
.
+ A is inconsistent if, and only if, A is inconsistent.
(K
.
+6) If Cn(A) = Cn(B), then K
.
+ A = K
.
+ B
9 We replaced ‘¬A 6∈ K’ with ‘{A} ∪ K is consistent’ here, since the two formulations are
classically equivalent.6 Belief Revision in Jason
Future releases of Jason will include an alternative deﬁnition of the brf() method dis-
cussed in Section 3.2 which implements the belief revision algorithm presented above.
A belief to be added to the belief base, passed to this new implementation of brf, may be
discarded or may result in the deletion of some other belief(s) in order to allow the new
belief to be consistently added to the belief base. Which beliefs are effectively deleted
is determined by a user-speciﬁed preference order (see below).
The only change to the AgentSpeak interpreter code that was necessary to facilitate
the implementation of the belief revision algorithm, was to explicitly include in any
internalbeliefchange,thelabeloftheplanthatexecutedthebeliefchange.Forexample,
if at a particular reasoning cycle, the intended means (i.e., plan instance) chosen for
execution is “@p1 te : ct <- +b.”, the belief b is annotated with “plan(p1)”
(in addition to source(self), as normally) before adding b to the belief base.
The graph used by the belief revision algorithm is implemented in terms of two
lists for each belief: the “dependencies list” (the literals that allowed the derivation of
the belief literal in question), and the “justiﬁes list” (which other beliefs the literal in
question justiﬁes, i.e., it appears in their dependencies list).10 Each belief to be added
has an annotation “plan()” recording the label of the plan instance that generated it,
which can be used to retrieve the necessary information regarding the antecedents of the
belief from the plan library (together with the uniﬁer used in that plan’s instance in the
set of intentions). For example, if the plan that generated the belief change, say +bl, has
the form “@p te : l1 & ...& ln <- bd”, where te is a triggering event and bd a
planbody,thesupportlistofthejustiﬁcationissimplythe(ground)literalsfromtheplan
context, “[l1,...,ln]”. Note that if the triggering event, te, is itself a belief (addition),
the literal in te is included together with the context literals in the support list. Further,
for each literal in l1,...,ln we add the justiﬁcation to the literal’s “justiﬁes” list. We
also record the time at which the justiﬁcation was added to the relevant list.
In addition to the “dependencies” and “justiﬁes” lists, the belief revision algorithm
also requires the deﬁnition of a partial order relation specifying contraction preference.
To allow for user customisation, this is deﬁned as a separate method that can also be
overridden. The default deﬁnition of this method gives preference to perceived infor-
mation over communicated information (as also happens in [23]), and in case of in-
formation from similar sources, it gives preference to newer information over older
information (this is why the time when a justiﬁcation was inserted is also annotated, as
explained above).
The implementation described above is conservative in revising only the agent’s
belief state. The agent’s plans are considered part of the agent’s program and are not
revised (though revising, e.g., plans received from other agents would be an interesting
extension). Similarly, when revising beliefs derived using ontological rules, we assume
the ontology used by the agent to be immutable and consistent and that it is consis-
10 Note that the “dependencies” and “justiﬁes” lists are associated with each unique belief, i.e.,
a ground belief atom and the annotations with which it is asserted into the belief base, rather
than the internal Jason representation of the belief which holds all annotations for a given
ground belief atom in a single list.tent with every other ontology it references. Moreover, intention revision remains the
responsibility of the programmer. Changes in the agent’s intentions following the re-
moval of beliefs to restore consistency must be programmed using the appropriate Ja-
son mechanisms. All belief changes, regardless of whether they are internal, communi-
cated, or perceived can lead to the execution of a plan which could be used, for example,
to drop an intention. If the belief revision algorithm has to remove any beliefs to en-
sure consistency, this will also generate the appropriate (belief-deletion) internal events,
which in turn can trigger the execution of a such plans to revise the agent’s intentions.
7 An Example
To illustrate the importance of belief revision in the context of AgentSpeak, we present
a simple example of an agent that buys stocks from the stock market. The agent receives
ﬁnancial information (or guesses) from other agents, some of which can be trusted (or
arecurrentlyconsideredtrustworthy),anditalsohasaccesstoWebServiceswhichﬁlter
relevant newspaper stories and provide symbolic versions of such news for stock market
agents. As these web services are authenticated, this corresponds to actual perception
of the “environment”.
Suppose our agent receives a message hag1,tell,salesUp(c1)i and its plan library
has the following plan:
+salesUp(C)[source(A)]
: wellManaged(C) & trust(A)
<- +goodToBuy(C).
When the plan is executed, the brf() method will then add
goodToBuy(c1)[source(ag1)] to the belief base with
[salesUp(c1), wellManaged(c1), trust(ag1)] in its “dependen-
cies” list, and goodToBuy(c1) is added to the “justiﬁes” lists of the beliefs
salesUp(c1), wellManaged(c1), and trust(ag1). In the context of the
overall agent program, the idea is that if the agent ever comes to have the goal of
buying stocks, it can make use of beliefs such as goodToBuy, together with various
other conditions, to decide which speciﬁc stocks to buy.
Now assume that from the ﬁnancial news web service, the agent acquires the belief
stocks(c2,10)[source(percept)], which means that company c2’s stocks
are up by 10 points, and the agent also believes that rival(c2,c1) (i.e., that com-
panies c2 and c1 are competitors), so that increase in the stocks of one of them tend
to lead to decrease in the other’s stocks. Assume further that the agent happens to have
the following plan:
+stocks(C,P)
: P > 5 & rival(C,R)
<- +˜goodToBuy(R).
When the plan is executed, the attempt to simply add˜goodToBuy(c1) to the belief
base would not be carried out because it would result in an inconsistent belief state.
With the available contraction preference relation, it is not difﬁcult to see that in this
instance, the algorithm would contract goodToBuy(c1) because its support is basedon communicated information which is less reliable than the observed information from
which ˜goodToBuy(c1) was derived.
As can be seen, the belief revision algorithm takes care of ensuring that inconsisten-
cies such as (goodToBuy(c1)∧˜goodToBuy(c1)) never occur in the belief base.
Moreover, the data structures used by the algorithm (the dependencies and justiﬁcations
lists) allow it to automatically revise the belief base in ways that previously would re-
quire major programming efforts from the user. For example, suppose the agent receives
news that a crooked CEO has just been ﬁred from c1. The agent is likely to have a plan
to update its beliefs about c1 being well managed as a consequence of such new in-
formation about the CEO. If the user has chosen the reason-maintenance style of the
algorithm, and there is no other justiﬁcation for goodToBuy, then the algorithm would
remove not only the wellManaged(c1) belief, but also the goodToBuy(c1) be-
lief because the latter depends on the former. Similarly if for some reason the agent
later ﬁnds out that ag1 is not trustworthy after all.
However, with the user choosing the coherence style of the algorithm, removing
wellManaged would not remove goodToBuy. Although in this example the reason-
maintenance style is clearly more adequate, in other applications the coherence style
might be more useful. In any case, it is clear that without the use of an automatic belief
revision algorithm, it would be very difﬁcult for a programmer to ensure such kind of
revision would occur appropriately at all times. This would require that the programmer
developed an application-speciﬁc brf method, or else writing speciﬁc plans to handle
all possible events (due to belief changes) that might affect any such inferences.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
As multi-agent programming languages become richer, it becomes harder for program-
mers to ensure that the belief states of agents developed using these languages are kept
consistent. In this paper we brieﬂy summarised the rationale for including automatic be-
lief revision in an agent programming language. Using the AgentSpeak programming
language as an example, we showed how a number of features recently added to the
language dramatically increase the need for automatic belief revision. We motived the
choice of a polynomial-time belief revision algorithm and described its integration into
the Jason AgentSpeak interpreter. We also gave a simple example which illustrates the
utility of such an automatic belief revision mechanism in a practical multi-agent sys-
tem application, and sketched how it can signiﬁcantly reduce the programming efforts
required. We believe that other agent-oriented programming languages and their plat-
forms [5], which currently push responsibility for maintaining a consistent belief state
onto programmers, can also beneﬁt from our approach.
We are aware of a number of limitations of the work presented here. In future work,
we plan to further explore the issue of the interaction of belief revision with the Jason
extension that allows the belief base to refer to OWL ontologies and uses ontological
reasoning as part of the AgentSpeak interpreter [17], and to address the issue the infer-
ences that occur from complex test goals. On the more practical side, we plan to develop
large-scale agent applications to assess the performance of Jason with belief revision.Acknowledgements
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